Preface
On 1 March 2013, Nicos Anastasiades took office as the seventh President of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus was facing an unprecedented economic crisis. The banking system was on the verge of collapse and the country was facing bankruptcy. The new president was elected under the slogan “The Crisis needs a Leader” and Anastasiades had the makings of a leader because in 2004 he was the only Cypriot politician who had supported the Annan Plan that would have reunited the island that had been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded and occupied the northern third. The Plan, however, was voted down by 76% of Greek Cypriots, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted it.
Named after the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Annan Plan was the first comprehensive plan for solving the decades old Cyprus problem. It was the culmination of negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that began in 1999 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. While similar negotiations had failed in the past, this time there was an incentive for all sides to solve the Cyprus problem through the understanding that a federal Cyprus would then join the EU and Turkey would begin accession negotiations. However, the two main proponents of this Plan, the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides, both lost their respective elections before the talks were concluded. Their successors, Kostas Karamanlis and Tassos Papadopoulos, incited and supported by Russia, subsequently undermined this effort. On 1 May 2004 Cyprus joined the EU with its national problem unresolved and the application of the European acquis suspended in the northern part of Cyprus controlled by the Turkish army since Turkey invaded the island in 1974.
Hopes for solving the Cyprus problem were raised once again in 2013, as a result of the economic crisis, and when Nicos Anastasiades led the country. The discovery of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s desire to become an energy hub in the region created a new incentive for a Cyprus solution. This hope also motivated me when in March 2013 I took the post of Special Assistant to President Anastasiades. The stand he had taken in 2004 in favor of reuniting the island was the basis of a long personal relationship and cooperation I had with the new President.
Nicos Anastasiades’ first few weeks in office were traumatic. As President he had to make tough decisions to save the economy. But at the same time he had been a lawyer representing huge Russian financial interests. From the first decisions he took on economic issues it became clear that he was shackled by dependencies on Russian interests. In the end, during a dramatic all-night session with the Eurogroup, the IMF and the European Commission in Brussels, he was forced to accept a memorandum of understanding, practically at gunpoint, that would rescue the Cypriot economy, but forcing a haircut of depositors in Cypriot banks.
In 2014 I published a book on the policy of the great powers towards the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This book exposed for the first time to a Cypriot readership the double game the Soviet Union was playing, on the one hand encouraging the Turkish invasion, while on the other convincing all Cypriots that the invasion was a Nato plot. As soon as the book was published, the Russian Embassy in Nicosia demanded from President Anastasiades that I be removed from the post of Special Assistant to the President. I then joined Cyprus’ EU Commissioner Christos Stylianides’ cabinet in Brussels.
Crime at Crans-Montana is my insider’s account of how the Cyprus problem was handled by Anastasiades. It’s also a testimony on how the country is being governed, how decisions on important issues are made, and how foreign interests exert their influence on this system of power, which includes the media as well.
This book is based on what I witnessed with my own eyes, as well as research that I conducted. My personal accounts cover the time when I was working with Nicos Anastasiades before he was elected President, my time as Special Assistant to the President and my continuing collaboration with him while I was working at the cabinet of Commissioner Christos Stylianides.
Even though the Cyprus problem was not part of his portfolio, Stylianides was personally interested in the matter, and assigned me the job of following developments. As the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, he participated in foreign policy and had excellent working relations with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. He also had direct contact with Turkey regarding matters relevant to his portfolio.
Stylianides stayed in touch with the Cyprus problem process with the full understanding of Anastasiades, who often used his help. During this time, I often met with the President in Brussels as well as in Cyprus whenever I visited. At the height of our association, in the summer of 2016, he tasked me with preparing a study comparing the convergences that had been agreed in the talks between himself and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı, to the Annan Plan of 2004 and the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959. Anastasiades gave me access to all the documents of his talks with Akıncı. At the same time I was in direct contact with the President’s associates and functioned as a member of the team that supported him during the talks.
Throughout the time I was working at Christos Stylianides’ office, I continued to stay in touch with what was going on in Cyprus. My link with the Presidential Palace was the Director of the President’s Press Office, Pambos Charalambous. We spoke regularly and he would keep me informed of developments at the Presidential Palace in connection with the Cyprus problem. I kept a diary in which I would write down whatever he told me in chronological order. This proved invaluable for me in both enriching my knowledge and helping me to understand what was behind the President’s decisions.
My relationship with Anastasiades ended in January 2017. By that time he had changed his stand and we were no longer on the same page. I was no longer deemed useful, nor was I willing to serve a policy I did not believe in.
However, during the last six months before the final conference on Cyprus held in Crans-Montana, Switzerland in the summer of 2017, I was still involved in matters. The various parties concerned thought it was important to keep Stylianides in the loop, so I kept following developments. As a result I had access to privileged information, saw and read crucial documents, and gained a behind-the-scenes knowledge of events, which I diligently recorded in my personal diary.
I should state clearly that publishing this book is my choice alone and one in which none of the people I mention were involved. I did not secure anyone’s consent to make use of the information I obtained either as a Special Assistant to President Anastasiades or as a personal assistant to Commissioner Stylianides. I realized that I had been privy to historic events and experiences that no one else would be inclined or able to write about. I therefore consider I have a public duty and responsibility to share what I saw and learned. I firmly believe that the Cypriot people in particular deserve to know the truth of what really happened.
21/08/2023